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Resumen: 
El presentismo es visto generalmente como un mal necesario en historiografía. Este artículo 
explora lo positivo de esta inevitabilidad. Aplicando un enfoque filosófico al análisis discursivo 
en la tradición de la nueva historia cultural, se distingue –de una parte– entre un uso estratégico 
del presentismo, y –de otra–  un enfoque racionalista en historia. El artículo concluye 
considerando algunas implicaciones políticas en historiografía de las explicaciones racionalistas 
y de las explicaciones estratégicamente presentistas. Los modos de comprensión racionalistas 
inscriben las expectativas del pasado en las visiones del futuro; asignando al historiador el 
papel de profeta; y perpetuando nociones de agentes ahistóricos. En contraste, las historias 
estratégicamente presentistas incorporan una orientación que deliberadamente emplea las 
lentes y perspectivas del presente en orden a tener en cuenta supuestos y perspectivas actuales. 
Cuando las asunciones son examinadas en relación a las perspectivas presentistas, dichos 
presupuestos sueltan su rienda en el pensamiento. Dado que el presentismo es inevitable,  no 
debe ser desestimado por completo, sino que debe ser una cuestión sondeada y examinada 
críticamente. Con dicho foco, el presentismo estratégico en la historiografía debe posibilitar una 
reflexión sobre los límites de lo que es posible pensar. 
Palabras clave: presentismo, nueva historia cultural, genealogía, progreso, determinismo. 
_______________ 
* An English version of this paper was published in Paedagogica Historica, Vol. 44, Nº. 6, 
December 2008, 677-690.  We are grateful to the editors (Marc DePaepe, Ian Grosvenor, and 
Jeroen Dekker) for their generous permission to translate and print the article here in 
Profesorado.  
 
La traducción se debe a Slava López Rodríguez y la revisión técnica a Antonio Bolívar. 
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Abstract: 
Presentism is generally regarded as a necessary evil in historiography. This paper explores the 
upside of that inevitability. Using a philosophical approach to discourse analysis in the tradition 
of new cultural history, the paper distinguishes between a strategic use of presentism on the one 
hand, and a rationalistic approach to history on the other hand. The paper concludes by 
considering some political implications of rationalistic accounts and strategically presentistic 
accounts in historiography. Rationalistic accounts inscribe expectations of the past into visions 
of the future; they cast the historian in the role of prophet; and they perpetuate notions of 
ahistoric agency. In contrast, strategically presentistic histories incorporate an orientation that 
deliberately uses the lenses and perspectives of the present in order to bring current 
assumptions and perspectives into focus. When assumptions are examined in relation to 
presentistic perspectives, those assumptions loosen their reins on thought. Since presentism is 
unavoidable, presentism should not be dismissed outright, but ought to be subject to probing and 
critical examination. With such a focus, strategically presentistic historiography allows for a 
reflection on the limits of what it is possible to think. 
Key words: presentism; new cultural history; genealogy; progress; determinism. 
 
Rationalistic approaches to historiography: 
•  epistemologically impose a priori interpretations on historical phenomena, either that 
the present is the same as the past (presentistic mode), or that the present is 
different from the past (historicist mode); 
•  methodologically essentialise concepts in history (frequently manifested in the form 
of the assumption of progress); 
•  pedagogically construe the present as if it were caused or determined by the past.  
In contrast, strategically presentistic approaches to historiography: 
•  epistemologically allow for the possibility that the present may be similar and/or   
ifferent from the past; 
•  methodologically allow for both discontinuity and continuity in history, permitting a 
critical perspective on extra-historical mechanisms such as causality, linearity, or 
circularity; 
•  pedagogically recognise multiple interpretations of things both in the past and in the 
present. 
To begin, I distinguish theoretically between rationalistic and strategic approaches to 
educational historiography
1. Of course, these words have been used in many ways, and their 
                                                 
1 The meaning of strategic bears some resemblance to other terms that underwrite post-
analytic or non-telelogical approaches to historiography. Strategic history is considered 
pragmatic by some; see, for example, Donald H. Sheehan and Harold C. Syrett, eds, Essays in 
American Historiography; Papers Presented in Honor of Allan Nevins (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1960); Cleo H. Cherryholmes, Reading Pragmatism (New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1999); and Norman J. Wilson, History in Crisis? Recent Directions in 
Historiography (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999). It has been called critical and 
effective by others; see, for example, Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective Histories: 
Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology (New York: Routledge, 1994); David Owen, 
“Genealogy as Exemplary Critique: Reflections on Foucault and the Imagination of the 
Political,” Economy and Society 24, no. 4 (1995 November): 489–506; and Allan R. Buss, “In 
Defense of a Critical-Presentist Historiography,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral 
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meanings have been widely debated, but I specify particular meanings here in order to make 
a point. By rationalistic, I mean appealing to timeless, universal, perennial or general 
principles to explain change or dynamics in history. The designation rationalistic allows me to 
draw attention to the similarities between conventional notions of presentism and 
historicism. As an example, for radical revisionist historians, presentism was not a theoretical 
problem because it was more important for history to be told in a way that was useful for 
solving present problems. And for historicists, presentism was not a theoretical problem as 
long as there were methodological safeguards in place to avoid it. Rationalistic approaches to 
historiography seek phenomena, statements, storylines and conclusions that can be applied 
across various historical contexts. In rationalistic approaches to history, the problem of 
presentism is either avoidable by methodological rigor or forgivable as a means to politically 
useful ends. 
In contrast, by strategic, I mean deliberate recognition of the inevitability of 
presentism, using that vantage point as an opportunity to generate a critical understanding of 
our present circumstances. By critical understanding, I do not refer to the same thing as the 
radical revisionist normative project of solving current problems; I mean seeking multiple and 
unfamiliar perspectives on issues. For example, an educational historian may become 
fascinated with phrenology. A strategic use of presentism in historiography would frame a 
study of phrenology in the context of the current mania about mental measurement
2. With 
this strategy, it would become possible to examine why phrenology might be regarded as an 
important or interesting thing to study just now.  Such an approach to inquiry also puts an 
ethical/political burden on the historian. Strategic presentism means that historiographical 
investigation must include careful consideration of the politics of historical writing that 
influence the choice of subject, the construction of the reader, the rhetorical form of the 
argument and the authority of the historian. 
 
1. Situating this argument in historiographical theories 
In order to explain the context of my inquiry, I first introduce some of the 
historiographical contributions of Robert Nisbet
3, Beverly Southgate
4 and Michel Foucault
5. 
                                                                                                                                               
Sciences, 13 (1977): 252-260. Strategic presentism is also related to some meanings of 
reflexive in sociology; see, for example, Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, An Invitation to 
Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). It also resembles the notion 
of challenging orthodoxies as in Sol Cohen, Challenging Orthodoxies: Toward a New Cultural 
History of Education (New York: Peter Lang, 1999). I use the term strategic here to 
emphasise a self-consciously ethical project in historiography. 
2 See Cohen’s Challenging Orthodoxies for an example of a strategically presentist history of 
mental hygiene in education. 
3 Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (New York: Basic Books, 1980). 
4 Beverly Southgate, History: What and Why? Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern Perspectives 
(New York: Routledge, 1996). 
5 Michel Foucault, “On Ways of Writing History,” in Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method, And 
Epistemology, ed. James Faubion. Vol. 2 of The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954–
1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1998); Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History,” in Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method, And Epistemology, ed. James 
Faubion, Vol. 2 of The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954–1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (New 
York: New Press, 1998); Michel Foucault, “Return to History,” in Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, 
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These theorists provide some insight into the ways rationalistic approaches have permeated 
historiography. 
They show, in different ways, how historiographical assumptions have circumscribed 
educational discourse. The ways the histories are written renders some perspectives on 
education possible, and other perspectives unthinkable. 
Robert Nisbet’s The History of the Idea of Progress is a helpful examination of one 
particular type of rationalistic history, namely progressivism. Progress is a common Leitmotiv 
in history, and the assumption of progress has been heavily criticised by historiographers. 
Nisbet provides us with a history of history, and his history of the idea of progress cuts to the 
heart of the matter by documenting how the meaning of progress has changed over time. 
I provide a brief summary of Nisbet’s argument to illustrate how rationalistic 
assumptions about history can creep unannounced into historical accounts of almost anything. 
Nisbet argues that from the middle of the sixteenth century until the middle of the 
eighteenth century, the idea of progress was associated with Puritan notions of Providence: 
‘The progress of Providence!’ Burnet’s phrase could serve perfectly to epitomize the crucial 
historical process we are concerned with … that by which belief in the Christian God was 
supplanted in the minds of intellectuals by a belief in a certain natural and inexorable pattern 
of progress. In Burnet’s phrase we see the God-the-being transposed into God-the-unfolding, 
God-the-advancing. The faith in the permanence and regularity of natural law which so many 
historians ascribe to Cartesian sources might better be ascribed to Christian, chiefly Puritan
6. 
Nisbet’s overall point is that progress has meant many different things throughout 
history and that it is misguided to assume that progress is a natural or inevitable way to think 
about historical change. According to Nisbet, in the eighteenth century, “progress as 
providence” gave way to another idea of progress, namely, “progress as freedom”. The newer 
idea of freedom was fundamentally different from previous ideas; moreover, the newer idea 
of freedom did not evolve from or follow inevitably from previous ideas like providence. That 
is, according to Nisbet, the history of the idea of progress is not progressive. 
Nisbet documents the idea of “progress as freedom” by referring to the writings of 
Thomas Jefferson, Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant. This “enlightened” notion of progress 
(which was based on the assumption that humans had an innate propensity to advance in 
knowledge and develop in virtue) joined forces with Christian doctrine
7 to make the idea of 
progress-as-freedom into “‘not an accident but a necessity
8’”. 
What began with Turgot and Adam Smith, the American Founding Fathers, Godwin, 
and Mill reached its grand culmination and fulfillment in Spencer. No one since has added one 
iota to what is set forth so eloquently in Spencer’s writings: the belief that freedom is 
                                                                                                                                               
Method, And Epistemology, ed. James Faubion, Vol. 2 of The Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault 1954–1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1998). 
6 Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress, 129. 
7 Nisbet writes, “[I]f there is one generalization that can be made confidently about the 
history of the idea of progress, it is that throughout its history the idea has been closely 
linked with, has depended upon, religion or upon intellectual constructs derived from 
religion” (p. 352). 
8 Spencer, quoted in Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress, 178. 
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necessary to progress, and that the goal of progress, from the most distant past to the remote 
future, is ever ascending realization of freedom
9. 
Nisbet’s analysis separates the notion of “progress as freedom” from the idea of 
“progress as power”, exemplified in the writings of August Comte, Charles Darwin and Karl 
Marx: 
Freedom, equality, popular sovereignty – each of these became more than something to be 
cherished, worked for, and hoped for; set in the context of the idea of progress, each could 
seem not merely desirable but historically necessary, inevitable of eventual achievement. It 
was possible to show – as did Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Comte, Hegel, Marx and Spencer, 
among many others – that all history could be seen as a slow, gradual, but continuous and 
necessary ascent to some given end
10. 
Nisbet’s work offers an appreciation for how the idea of progress has been 
transformed over time in a way that is strategically presentistic insofar as it deliberately 
adopts its perspective from the present. The analysis offers a historical argument that 
recognises and makes visible the particular type of progress that is being assumed in today’s 
historical writing. 
Nisbet’s project does not solve any current educational or historiographical problems; 
however, the project does make it possible to ask several questions about histories of 
education: How does the historical narrative account for change? What are the assumptions in 
the text about where progress will eventually lead us? What factors are assumed to stand in 
the way of progress? What does this view of history assume about what people are expected 
to do in order to participate in the progressive flow of things? By asking these questions, the 
embedded assumptions and tacitly held ideals of an educational history can be made more 
explicit, and thereby subject to critical scrutiny. 
Beverly Southgate offers more contributions to the theories of writing history. Drawing 
from Marxism, feminisms and postcolonial theories, Southgate outlines recent challenges to 
the “old model” of writing history (see especially chapters 4 and 5). She concludes that the 
destabilisation of historical standards and presumptions leads to a condition of productive 
dynamism in the field of history: 
Marxism, feminism, and post-colonialism are, or were, themselves the product of a time and 
place, so subject to their own historical development, and destined for replacement by yet 
another ‘post-’; for ‘isms’ themselves fragment or lose their cutting edge….But, however 
rapidly aspects of these movements may be replaced and disdainfully discarded, a central 
message remains. For what all share is a recognition that conventional historical accounts of the 
past can be challenged, inasmuch as a change in perspective results in a new perception, which 
in turn opens the way to new interpretations and narratives. Then realisation of that possibility 
entails a recognition that history – our accounts of the past present, and future – could be 
different. History, in short, is not fixed: change is possible
11. 
When we combine Nisbet’s insights about progress with Southgate’s insights about the 
mutability of history, it becomes easier to imagine why educational historians might want to 
embrace the presentism of their narratives in strategic ways. First, progress itself is “the 
product of a time and place” and “destined for replacement”. Further, to challenge the 
                                                 
9 Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress, 236. 
10 Ibid., 171. 
11 Southgate, History: What and Why?, 106 (emphasis in the original). 
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assumption of progress is to recognise that history “could be different”. To problematise 
progress in this way helps to make visible various aspects of education that do not follow 
logically or causally from previous events. For example, this problematisation makes it 
possible to notice how today’s vocational education produces a (post-Fordist) flexible-role, 
multi-tasking, self-motivated worker in contrast to the Fordist model of the early 1900s in 
which roles were fixed and sequenced in an assembly line pattern. There is nothing natural, 
inevitable or rationally predictable about the change from Fordist to post-Fordist worker 
identity models. Strategic presentism de-naturalises (and thereby historicises) history. Nisbet 
historicises the idea of progress; Southgate problematises the grand narratives of history; and 
Foucault focuses on the political effects of writing history according to rational principles. 
Reacting in an interview to the criticisms of his 1966 publication of Les Mots et les Choses 
(The Order of Things) Michel Foucault stated: “I was struck by the following fact: professional 
historians recognised it as being a work of history, and many others, who have an antiquated 
and no doubt completely obsolete idea of history, clamored that history was being 
murdered
12.”  
He went on to explain that the problem with conventional histories, such as the 
tradition of the “history of ideas”, is that they appeal to “concepts that seem rather 
magical
13” to explain change in history. Rather than describing the relation of statements in a 
given text, those conventional histories draw on “exterior” concepts such as mentality, 
intention, structure, existential choice or psychoanalytic function to generalize about a group 
of statements. It is Foucault’s project, and characteristic of historiography after the linguistic 
turn, “to try, by playing a systematic game, to forego these … conveniences, and so … [make] 
… an effort to describe statements, entire groups of statements, while bringing out the 
relations of implication, opposition, exclusion that might connect them
14”. The project of 
historical analysis after the linguistic turn, then, is a search for patterns within a group of 
statements (i.e. a text; a discourse), and to be self-conscious about resorting to any concept 
that is exterior to—or at a conceptual/epistemological distance from—those statements. 
We can begin to see how the assumption of progress and/or the search for origins 
(“foundations”) might work to essentialise the meanings of schooling, teaching, citizenship, 
freedom and knowledge. Moreover, strategic presentism allows for the deliberate targeting of 
objects to be critiqued. Presentism invites the historian to ask not only “What knowledge is of 
most worth?” but also “What aspects of Spencer’s definition of knowledge do we take for 
granted today?”, “Are the political power struggles that shaped Spencer’s criteria of worth 
still relevant today?” or, alternatively, Foucault’s famous question: “What is it impossible to 
think?
15” 
 
2. An example of a rationalistic approach to educational history 
In this section I examine a widely used educational history textbook that rationalizes 
historical explanation, and I analyse the political implications of its essentialised definitions. 
                                                 
12 Foucault, “On Ways of Writing History,” 279. 
13 Ibid., 282. 
14 Ibid., 283. 
15 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. (New 
York:Random House, 1970), xv. 
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The text I examine is generally used for teacher preparation courses in foundations or history 
of education, so part of my analysis has to do with the implications of historiographic theory 
for teacher knowledge. 
John Pulliam and James Van Patten’s History of Education in America, already in its 
seventh edition, is an example of a history of education text commonly used in teacher 
preparation courses
16. There are three particularly striking aspects of this history text that 
are pertinent to my analysis: the semblance of objectivity, the essentialisation of key terms, 
and the specification of “future trends” in education. These are three of the theoretical 
mechanisms that operate to construct a rationalised account of history. 
 
2.1. Objectivism 
In its theoretical approach, the Pulliam and Van Patten text draws an explicit 
distinction between “interpretation” and “factual knowledge”: 
In order to pack as much information as possible into a succinct volume, interpretation is left 
largely to the reader or to professors who use the book as a text. Certainly the raging 
controversy between the traditionalists and revisionists is important. The differences between 
Michael Katz and H. Giroux (radical revisionists) and David Tyack (interpreter of social forces) 
are pronounced. Before judgments of interpretation can be made, there must be a wealth of 
factual knowledge, and that is provided in this book
17. 
Southgate describes this tendency as the “old model” of history, a model that is in 
denial about the inevitability of presentism
18. Southgate attributes the tendency to separate 
facts from interpretations to the pervasiveness of a positivistic model of science: 
The scientist, it is assumed, strives towards a direct perception and understanding of 
natural phenomena. There is an external natural reality, which is the subject-matter of 
science, and the truth of which may be grasped with the use of appropriate techniques. An 
account of that truth, free from personal bias, can then be presented, and it can be assumed 
that there will be general agreement about that truth, at least by experts working in the 
field. And similarly with history and its own subject-matter of the past
19. 
Historiographers have noted the irony of historians aspiring to this definition of 
science because practising scientists have problematised the possibility of “fact” for a long 
time
20. 
When educational histories are written in a way that separates fact from 
interpretation, they inscribe particular ways of thinking not only about history, but also about 
                                                 
16 John D. Pulliam and James J. Van Patten, History of Education in America, 7th ed. (Upper 
SaddleRiver, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999). 
17 Ibid., v–vi. 
18 She notes that the ideal of separating “what happened” from our perceptions and 
memories of what happened was expressed as early as the second century AD by Lucian. 
19 Southgate, History: What and Why?, 13. 
20 See, for example, Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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the meaning of education itself. First, they reiterate an obsolete and reductionist 
understanding of what history is. Second, they assume that knowledge is somehow objective 
rather than generated by historically specific sets of power relations, thereby dehistoricising 
knowledge. Third, by implication they construct the process of education as the acquisition of 
information rather than the production of knowledge. Fourth, the separation of fact from 
interpretation lacks reflexive and epistemological rigour because, since it is impossible to 
select information and organise it into a book without imposing a theoretical and interpretive 
framework, by claiming to separate fact from interpretation – in denying the inevitability of 
presentism – this history text undermines its own methodological framework. 
 
2.2. Essentialisation 
Despite its explicit claims to the contrary, the History of Education in America tacitly 
inscribes teleology and progress as evidenced when it describes the curriculum as “evolving”, 
the science as “developing” and information as “expanding”. Such descriptions are 
rationalistic because a curriculum can be conceived as “evolving” only if the narrative 
constructs an essential entity of curriculum  that can exist apart from its incarnations in 
various social constructions; information can be seen to “expand” only if information is 
construed as quantifiable in some way. 
The inscription of essentialism in Pulliam and Van Patten’s account of curriculum is 
evident in the language of sub-headings throughout the chapters, for example, “Curriculum 
Improvement
21”, “Inhibited Development of Education in the South
22”, “Development of 
Educational Philosophy
23” and “Evolution of the Modern Institutional Structure
24”. The 
questions for discussion at the ends of chapters include, “Give two examples of modern 
educators ‘reinventing the wheel’ because they lack historical knowledge and perspective
25”. 
The History of Education in America claims to be a record of ideas that have already been 
tried in the past, and it promotes the assumption that the old ideas will be found lacking or 
deficient in some way. The implication, then, is that by knowing this “factual” record of old 
ideas, educators will not waste effort “reinventing the wheel” but, rather, they will forge 
new – and presumably better – ideas for educational reform. 
This essentialising view of educational history reiterates the assumption that newer is 
better, and denies its own presentistic agenda. For example, describing the age of the 
common school revival, Pulliam and Van Patten write: 
Perhaps people of better quality and training would have been attracted to teaching if the pay 
and conditions could have been improved, but this was beyond the capability of the settlers in 
most of the newer areas of the country. It is true that even on the frontier some well-educated 
and excellent teachers could be found, but in most cases the quality of teaching was extremely 
                                                 
21 Pulliam and Van Patten, History of Education in America, 99. 
22 Ibid.,120. 
23 Ibid,138. 
24 Ibid.,151. 
25 Ibid.,15. 
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low and the children could expect to gain little learning in return for the brief time and small 
fees that were required of them
26. 
When this text asserts that money would have made better teaching probable, it does 
not take into account that the role and purpose of schooling in the mid-nineteenth century 
was unlike the role and purpose of schooling today. Pulliam and Van Patten’s account asserts 
that early settlers would have constructed comprehensive common schools with formally 
trained teachers if only they had had enough money to do so. Assuming that the common 
school has always been the ultimate goal and value for United States citizens, this view 
obscures arguments such as David Tyack’s that schooling was regarded by many people in the 
mid-nineteenth century as the imposition of an upper class world-view on the common people 
and a mechanism to perpetuate social inequalities
27. 
Ironically, Pulliam and Van Patten label Tyack’s history of education as 
“interpretation”, in contrast to their own “factual” account. However, I cite this example as 
evidence that the Pulliam and Van Patten text is an interpretation based on a particular set 
of rationalistic assumptions about the history of education, namely: (1) people have always 
regarded schooling as a means toward social betterment; (2) people have always aspired to 
have formally trained teachers; and (3) more educational opportunities means more progress 
for the citizenry. Tyack’s history, in contrast, portrays the establishment of the common 
school as contingent on the power relations that came together to construct the possibility 
for public education in the nineteenth century. 
What does this textbook teach us about the history of education?  Pulliam and Van 
Patten’s rationalising assumptions about schooling and the history of education teach us by 
implication to uphold today’s beliefs in educational meritocracy, whether they intend that 
political message or not. After all, if the history of education is not written in a way that 
recognizes the contentious power relations involved in the establishment of the common 
school, then education appears to be a transcendental value, and the common school appears 
to be the inevitable result of developmental improvement. When the history of the common 
school is presented that way, it becomes too easy for today’s educators to understand the 
history of education as a progressive extension of perennial and essential values. If schooling 
is assumed to reflect timeless and essential human values, then educational success becomes 
a process of dispersing those values in ever-widening circles, providing access to schooling for 
more people, and bringing people into schools for longer periods of time. From there, it is a 
short step to a meritocratic view of a student’s success or failure: If schools embody essential 
human values, then attainment of school values means an individual’s successful acquisition 
of human values, and failure to attain school values means an individual’s failure to acquire 
essential human values. 
Telling the history of education in this rationalistic way allows for meritocratic 
judgments about students, but it does not allow for some other questions to be asked, for 
example: 
In what ways does a common-school curriculum embody injustices that are particular to a time 
and place? To what extent are some assumptions about perennial educational values actually 
socially and culturally specific? And how does the common school curriculum produce its own 
definitions of normal and deviant? 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 98. 
27 David Tyack, The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1974). 
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2.3. Forecasting 
Because Pulliam and Van Patten’s history is written with the rationalistic assumption 
of progress, it is not surprising that they can offer a forecast of the future of education or 
that they envision the future of education as a continuation of present-day thinking and 
values. 
Here is an excerpt from their historical predictions: 
Although we cannot be certain about what will take place in the immediate future and long-
range forecasts are always risky, there are certain trends in American education that seem 
likely to occur. Of course, any major change, such as a new technique of learning or a war, 
would alter trends in a dramatic way. If some degree of stability continues in the next decades, 
the following events seem likely to occur….
28
Not surprisingly, the trends that Pulliam and Van Patten forecast are progressive in 
every sense. They predict the prolongation of schooling to “continue throughout life”, the 
extension of schooling to remote parts via distance education, the expansion of the 
curriculum to be “as broad as life itself”, an “increase in the number of people engaged in 
teaching and learning”, more people will spend “a great deal of every day of their lives in 
some kind of learning environment” and, finally, the efficiency of information absorption will 
be intensified by means of “chemical and electronic learning aids including brain 
stimulation
29”. By objectifying, essentialising and forecasting, this history of education 
rationalizes history and constructs knowledge as abstract, neutral, exterior and (ironically) 
ahistorical. Furthermore, this history perpetuates existing injustices of power relations by 
reifying some culturally specific values of schooling. Finally, it forecloses the theoretical 
possibility of meaningful change in existing relations that construct education by casting the 
future in a seamless continuation of present trends. 
 
3. An example of a strategic approach 
Through overuse, the meaning of the term class  has decayed and deteriorated in 
educational discourse. Recognising this, David Hamilton wrote a book that documents how the 
term  class  (as in classroom or school class) has changed meaning over time
30.Hamilton’s 
history does not assume that the way we commonly understand class today is the same as the 
way  class  was understood a century ago, neither does it assume that the meaning is 
necessarily different. Rather, Hamilton shows how the meaning of class has undergone several 
changes commensurate with changes in ways of thinking and reasoning, and as a product of 
particular historical relations. For example, class has only recently been used to describe a 
group of students taught by one teacher. In other times, class referred to an age cohort or a 
proficiency level. The changes in the meaning of class are illustrative of changes in the way 
                                                 
28 Pulliam and Van Patten, History of Education in America, 303. 
29 Ibid., 304–305. Pulliam and Van Patten’s history distinguishes itself from other more critical 
educational histories when it states forthrightly in the conclusion that “The challenge for 
education is to prepare individuals for job market reality” (p. 305). Not all progressive 
histories of education espouse this liberal view. 
30 David Hamilton, Towards a Theory of Schooling (London: Falmer, 1989). 
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curriculum has been perceived and studied, and the meanings of class are shown to be the 
product of event-specific power relations. 
Considerable work has been done to document the increase in the role of the state 
has played in the institutional configuration of schooling from the eighteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries
31; less commentary is available about teaching methods and classroom 
practices of those times. Hamilton, however, provides one example of a documented history 
of classroom practices. Hamilton argues that it was only after 1815 in Scotland, for example, 
that pedagogy was conceived in terms of class-based instruction. The transition from 
individualized instruction to group-based instruction is shown to have been contentious and 
historically particular. Andrew Bell’s Madras System of class-based pedagogy, Hamilton 
writes, was developed to teach the “illegitimate” (i.e. mixed-race) children of military 
personnel in India
32. An early form of simultaneous instruction was the “gallery lesson” in the 
1830s
33. After the 1830s, the organisation of teaching into groups – a reform that had been 
unsuccessfully promoted for several decades – finally took hold. In educational discourse of 
the mid-nineteenth century, it was part of the discourse to think that group-based teaching 
was actually more efficient for learning than tutorial or individual lessons. Group-based 
education had been promoted by educationalists for decades, but it was not until the mid-
nineteenth century that the idea was taken up in popular discourse. The focus of teaching 
eventually shifted from the individual to the group: “Indeed, it was not until the 1860s and 
1870s that teachers, rooms and classes began to converge into a one-to-one relationship
34.” 
Moreover, the rise of the concept of “class” in pedagogy was homologous with Linneas’ 
classification system in biology: “Few commentators … have noted the contemporaneous 
emergence of equalised classes in educational, biological and social theory. In all cases, the 
shift was from individuals considered in ‘ranks’ to groups considered in ‘classes’
35.” 
Hamilton’s analysis is strategically presentist insofar as it deliberately proceeds on the 
basis of current assumptions about the meaning of the term class. Historicising the meaning 
of the term class, Hamilton shows by historical comparison how our current common-sense 
meaning of the term is narrow, limited and culturally specific. When we denaturalise our 
understanding of the word class, then it becomes possible to see aspects of current 
educational practices in a new light. It becomes possible to question the ways current 
meanings of class  produce other accepted definitions of classroom management, 
developmental appropriateness, class as community, and even the requirements for 
graduation and credentialing. 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Carl Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American 
Society,1780–1860 (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983); and Lawrence A. Cremin, 
American Education: The Colonial Experience, 1607–1783 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). 
32 Hamilton, Towards a Theory of Schooling, 78. 
33 Ibid., 9. 
34 Ibid., 10. Later, at the turn of the next century, pedagogical techniques would again target 
individuals, but that “individual” would no longer be the authentic humanist like Emile; 
rather the progressive individual would be seen to be in personal possession of populationally 
defined characteristics such as race, class and gender. For a discussion of “possessive 
individualism” see Thomas S. Popkewitz, A Political Sociology of Educational Reform: 
Power/Knowledge in Teaching,s Teacher Education, and Research (New York: Teachers 
College Press, 1991). 
35 Hamilton, Towards a Theory of Schooling, 116, endnote 11. 
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Under other historical circumstances, with a different definition of class, other 
related assumptions about developmental appropriateness and credentialing would also be 
revamped. So Hamilton’s strategic history of the term is a valuable intellectual and political 
contribution to critical studies of education.   
Hamilton’s history is not offered as a recommendation for solving current educational 
problems. Rather, it is an example of a strategic deployment of presentism because it 
recognizes the inevitability of presentism, and it also uses a historical orientation to 
challenge current assumptions or orthodoxies
36 about education. Citing Richard Hofstadter, 
Cohen writes: 
Historians are caught between their desire to count in the world and their desire to understand 
it, between their desire to do good and to do good historical scholarship, between their desire 
to create a historically sound past and to create a usable past for the present. The problem is 
that such desires are at odds with each other
37. 
H a m i l t o n ’ s  t e x t  m a n a g e s  t o  b e  b o t h  h i s t orically sound and usable for the present 
precisely because it acknowledges the inevitability of a presentist perspective on historical 
events, and uses that inevitability to forge eye-opening analyses of the past. 
 
4. Rationalistic historiography versus strategic historiography: some political 
considerations 
The previous sections were focused on the theoretical and analytical distinctions 
between rationalistic and strategic accounts of educational history. In this section, I focus on 
the political implications of different historiographical approaches. I argue that rationalistic 
accounts of educational history tend to be deterministic in so far as their imposed relations 
between past and present are isomorphic with the presumed relation between present and 
future. Moreover, rationalistic accounts reiterate existing hierarchies of privilege by 
essentialising the meanings of terms. In contrast, strategic presentism tends to destabilise 
existing power relations through more contingent and less certain explanations of relations. 
Further, assumptions about education get unpacked and denaturalised, making its 
components susceptive to critical analysis. 
 
4.1. Rationalistic approaches 
As we have seen, some educational histories rationalise relations between events as 
an unfolding of timeless and universal truths (e.g. divine prophecy; cause and effect; 
dialectic; progress). In the process, the accounts of curricular change tend to essentialise 
meanings. 
For example, current liberal and critical modernist histories of curriculum generally 
inscribe metaphysical assumptions through the use of concepts like reason and freedom, and 
the belief in a humanist agent with the capability of resistance. Both of these assumptions 
depend on essentialisation of concepts to explain history. In the case of Pulliam and Van 
Patten’s history text, the teleology of progress is possible only because reason and freedom 
                                                 
36 See Cohen’s Challenging Orthodoxies. 
37 Cohen, Challenging Orthodoxies, 56. 
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are understood as rationalistic, essential qualities that change only in magnitude over time. 
The way to chart the progress of freedom is to assume that there is such a thing whose 
continuous development can be recorded. Most significantly, with the teleology of progress 
driving their historical narrative, it becomes inevitable that current curricular practices will 
be regarded as allowing more personal freedom than previous practices did; their assumption 
of progress does not allow for the possibility that we may have “gone backwards” and become 
less free. From this historiographical perspective, current educational practices that 
discipline and normalise people in new ways will not fit into the progressive narrative, and so 
will be rendered invisible and unexamined. 
The assumed rational relation between past and present events carries over as the 
assumed rational relation between present and future events; the future becomes predictable 
on the basis of relations in the past (teleology or coherent linear time). This assumption of 
teleology suggests a degree of determinism in predicting the future. I do not claim that 
analyses that deny their own presentistic tendencies are wrong. Rather, I argue that they 
inscribe a particular analytic point of view with particular theoretical consequences. One 
consequence is that histories that assume continuity limit possibilities for the future 
according to what follows continuously from the past and the present. If a historical analysis 
assumes that a sequence of events in history could be explained as predictable causes and 
effects, then it follows that events in the future ought to be predictable in terms of the same 
patterns of causes and effects. Therefore, in continuous-narrative histories, possibilities for 
the future are theoretically limited to what can be regarded as continuous with the relation 
between the past and the present. This constraint is problematic for an emancipatory agenda 
because untold possibilities for the future are theoretically foreclosed. Histories that assume 
continuity tend to foreclose the future possibility of radical change from present social 
relations
38. 
Most liberal educational discourse today inscribes the theoretical consequences of 
rationalising history, namely, it tends to advocate continued progress and evolution. The 
resultant attempts to initiate reform in education are thwarted in so far as the assumption of 
historical continuity sustains existing social relations and power structures. Liberal visions of 
the future resemble visions of the past. When liberal histories advocate that we go “back to 
basics” or “reclaim our humanity”, they invoke a “golden age”. This tendency has sometimes 
led to the characterisation of histories as expressions of nostalgia
39. In any case, liberal 
assumptions of historical continuity work against the possibility of change. Therefore, studies 
of curricular change that impose or assume rationalised explanations for change – like 
“progress” – may limit the possibilities for the future according to what it was possible to 
think in the (culturally specific) past or present. 
Further, rationalising accounts place the educational historian (or other intellectual) 
in the position of oracle (great portender?) vis-à-vis the future possibilities for education. For 
example, alluding to Cornel West’s Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times, Dennis Carlson 
writes, “progressives have a responsibility to speak in a ‘prophetic voice’ and engage in 
‘prophetic visioning’”
40. Carlson aims to make “progressivism more attuned to a rapidly 
                                                 
38 Remarkably, it was Marx whose theories told us that true freedom could not be envisioned 
by those who were not yet free. 
39 For a discussion comparing the attitude of nostalgia with that of imagination, see Stephen 
E. Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: Free Press, 1990). 
40 Dennis Carlson, “Finding a Voice, and Losing Our Way?,” Educational Theory 48, no. 4 
(1998): 548. 
12  The upside of presentism   
shifting cultural terrain and more capable of articulating a powerful new voice – one that 
leads to a ‘progressive restoration’ in American education and culture
41”.  By assuming this 
role, the modernist historian assumes a peculiar place in relation to history and in relation to 
subjectivity. That is, if history is theorised in terms of dialectical reasoning, continuity and/or 
teleology, then that same history cannot account for changes in who has power unless they 
appeal to some extra-historic mechanism. In Carlson’s account, it is the autonomous resisting 
agent – in this case the critical intellectual – who can move history. The intellectual must 
assume a position outside of history in order to “resist” dominant forces. This relation 
suggests that a theory of history that rests on rationalistic explanations of historical change 
requires autonomous (ahistoric) agency
42. 
 
4.2. Strategic approaches 
In contrast, strategic approaches to understanding change that do not assume such 
rational relations over time have other consequences. Historicising approaches to accounts of 
curricular change explain events as particular to a time and place, and strategically 
presentistic accounts take the inevitable effects of current perspectives into account. Events 
are assumed to be exemplary of a specific historical moment, having no necessary or rational 
relation to events that came before or afterwards, in other words, educational phenomena 
are produced by circumstances of historical contingency. 
Presentism as a critical strategy may be useful on two grounds. First, strategic 
presentism does not embed the predictive theoretical mechanisms of continuity that 
constrain historical and future possibilities. A strategically presentistic approach allows a 
historical analysis to un-determine future possibilities – to challenge orthodoxies
43. This is a 
departure from progressive histories that tend to paint a picture of a better future (or a 
golden past) as a means of offering “solutions”. Rationalistic histories seek to formalize 
regular and predictable relations that are essentialised, meaning precisely not historically 
contingent. Unlike rationalising accounts, strategic arguments seek to explain that current 
circumstances did not arise teleologically as inevitable, necessary, natural or predictable 
effects of previous circumstances. Strategic presentism construes the present as mutable 
instead of fixed. By allusion, assumptions that seemed solid melt into air. Analytically 
speaking, then, historical contingency avoids the theoretical trap of determinism. 
Strategically presentist historiography incorporates an orientation that deliberately 
uses the lenses and perspectives of the present in order to bring current perspectives into 
focus. 
When present assumptions are examined in relation to various historical contexts, 
those assumptions loosen their reins on thought. Since presentism is unavoidable, our 
presentistic lenses ought to become objects of our critical examination
44. In this way, the 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 553. 
42 Furthermore, any possibility of emancipation requires the intervention of the critical 
intellectual in order to write the autonomous agent into theory 
43 See Cohen, Challenging Orthodoxies. 
44 This proposed vantage point is also inevitably shaped by a presentistic perspective. As they 
say: It’s turtles all the way down. 
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limits of what it is possible to think can be approached. Herein lies the critical potential of an 
approach of strategic presentism. 
Finally, strategic accounts displace the historian/intellectual from the position of 
vanguard, and they open up more diverse sites for investigation and untold possibilities for 
change. The sense of control in rationalistic accounts of change comes from the belief that 
one can predict what is going to happen and, with proper planning, one can anticipate 
problems and take proper precautions. Ian Hacking calls this “the taming of chance
45”. In 
contrast, more strategic accounts of educational history do not inscribe the ideal of the 
intellectual historian as prophet; they do not assume it is the intellectual’s job to take 
control of the situation. In this way, historicising accounts embody a definition of democracy 
that assumes contributions from widely dispersed and diverse constituencies. 
 
5. Conclusion 
It’s not a defect of [history and archaeology] to find their point of departure in our 
own actuality. (Michel Foucault
46) 
When reading, writing and teaching educational history, it is fruitful to examine the 
extent to which that history inscribes teleology, progress or other rationalistic mechanisms. If 
the history inscribes progress or rationalises its objects of study, then it may inadvertently 
prescribe conservatism and foreclose possibilities for change. Engaging in such histories may 
also serve to reiterate the very premises or ways of thinking that the history purports to 
undo. On the other hand, when reading accounts of education that historicise the events and 
terms, then it is useful to examine the language and practices that render something 
“reasonable” in its own time. In this way, strategic presentism can help point out unintended 
dimensions of historiography. As Cohen writes: 
The new cultural historiography provides a recognition that there are other ways to be 
relevant and useful to the profession: useful in challenging orthodoxies in education, raising 
questions about ‘solutions’ in education, providing historical contexts for critical thinking 
about the present moment in education, and helping to make our colleagues, our students, 
and the general public more sophisticated consumers of history
47. 
Strategic accounts can offer a perspective that highlights the diverse technologies 
(i.e., languages, practices and ways of thinking) and the density of repetitions in language, 
reason and performance that serve to support the status quo. When educational history is 
written with present assumptions in mind, then educational practices may become less 
naturalised, less reified and more susceptive to study. Moreover, when education is analysed 
as the product of multifarious historical influences, then accounts of educational change are 
less determined by the oracular skills of the historian, and more open to multiple and diffuse 
sites of intervention and change. 
 
                                                 
45 Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
46 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Things,” in Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961–1984, 
ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), 14–15. 
47 Cohen, Challenging Orthodoxies, 27–28. 
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